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By JOE TRENTO

WASHINGTON — The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now awaiting Senate action is based on doctored intelligence provided as long as 10 years ago by Henry Kissinger, according to high-level officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State:

The first SALT treaty, signed by President Nixon and ratified by the Senate in 1972, was approved after Kissinger ordered the suppression of CIA intelligence showing the Russians were ahead of the United States in strategic nuclear weapons, according to officials close to the negotiations

The technical assumptions made for the first SALT agreement are the basis for SALT II, now before the U.S. Senate. That technical information was distorted and suppressed by Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security adviser, officials said.

One of the CIA officials involved in evaluating satellite information about Soviet missile capability was John A. Paisley, who disappeared a year ago on the Chesapeake Bay. Former and present CIA associates of Paisley say he became so disgusted with the suppression of the information that he quit the agency, only to return in a role where he helped investigate counterintelligence chief James J. Angleton's suspicions about Kissinger's loyalty.

The SALT II treaty was largely: drafted by William Hyland, a Kissinger aide at SALT I: Hyland left the Carter Administration last winter to become Kissinger's occasional spokesman and aide. He declined comment on the charges, saying only, "We have nothing to say to you about this." Kissinger himself did not return phone calls.

Evidence that Kissinger ordered the information suppressed, and replaced with doctored information, comes from top-ranking government officials who served in the constant of constant in the strategic vertication of ermment officials who served in the constant in the strategic vertication of ermment of the constant in the strategic vertication of the strategic vertication of ermment of the strategic vertication of ermment of the strategic vertication of t CIA, State and Defense departments between 1969 and 1972 when

According to present and former CIA officials, a secret bureaucratic civil war began in the spy agency in 1969 when Kissinger asked the CIA's Office of Strategic Research to withhold data from certain military leaders, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kissinger feared that such information would damage his efforts to achieve detente with the Soviets and to negotiate successfully an arms limitation treaty.

Among the officials confirming Kissinger's actions was Dr. Raymond S. Cline, who was in charge of strategic nuclear information for both the State Department and the CIA during 31/2 years that spanned the negotiations.

Kissinger lied about about numbers and accuracy of Soviet warheads to "mute opposition to SALT I and get the treaty he wanted," Cline said.
"Kissinger feared the estimate

the CIA had given him would have given enemies of the treaty enough ammunition to see that it never passed the Senate Cline explained.

Kissinger pulled numbers out of his hat," Cline charged, and he did it to "get the treaty through because he didn't have confidence that the facts were on his side.".

Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., said that "at a minimum there was confusion created by some of the assertions Kissinger made at SALT! I and after SALT I that related to what the Soviets did have and what! they didn't have and what they, would do Some people say that we just got outbargained, others said that Kissinger may have flatly mis-

"There is no question that something went wrong," said Biden, who is a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate committee charged with passing on the strategic verification of

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final .... but left in Helsinki various CIA strategic weapons experts who could have advised Kissinger on whether the Soviets were telling the truth about their capabilities. Angleton says that Kissinger's solo negotiations "put our security in jeopardy."

"To this day the CIA does not know exactly what was agreed to in the Soviet Union, nor what we gave away to get the agreement," said Cline, who has become a strong critic of Kissinger during the Salt II debate: A Note of the Total

According to Senate Intelligence Committee sources and Cline, Kissinger tried to "play it both ways with intelligence." Cline said that before the SALT talks Kissinger needed a "stick to get the Russians to the table so he decided to try and scare the President and Congress into believing that the Soviets had caught up with us in MIRVs in order to get more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) funding to intimi-date the Soviets. MIRVs are multi-ple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, missiles with several warheads, which can be directed to different targets. According to Cline, in 1969 Kissinger tried to block CIA intelligence showing the Soviets were unable to outfit their ICBMs with multiple warheads that could be directed to different targets from one rocket.